



How & Why Governance Dynamics Emerge in Inter-Organizational Networks: 
A Meta-Ethnographic Analysis 
 
ABSTRACT 
Over the past few decades, governance was a pervasive theme in discussions of strategy and 
management in the context of inter-organizational networks. To date, network researchers call for a 
dynamic theory of governance in inter-organizational networks to deal with increased uncertainty in 
the network environment and unpredictable network changes. In response to this call, the present 
research aims to generate a better understanding of how and why governance mechanisms in inter-
organizational networks change over time and the implications of such governance evolutions for the 
network actors. Based upon a meta-ethnographic analysis of 19 longitudinal case studies, a multitude 
of governance mechanisms ranging from relational to formal governance are identified at the single 
dyad, multiple dyad and network level. These governance mechanisms constitute five network 
governance dynamics over time: purely relational, relational-formal, combinations of relational and 
formal, formal-relational, and purely formal governance patterns. These governance dynamics 
empirically demonstrate that governance in inter-organizational networks is always possible in other, 
although not infinite, ways. By detailing the conditions under which path dependencies occur, the 
present research advances the literature on network governance. 
 





Managing inter-organizational networks is an absolute necessity in a “society of 
networks” (Raab & Kenis, 2009). As a consequence, network governance – defined as “a 
mechanism of reaching and implementing decisions whereby, instead of hierarchy and 
command or markets and prices, networks and cooperation are at work” (Hollstein, Matiaske, 
& Schnapp, 2017: 1) – was pervasive in discussions of strategy and management (Jones, 
Hesterly & Borgatti, 1997; Provan & Kenis, 2008). Today, inter-organizational networks are 
ever more complex with different types of actors (e.g., individuals, firms, NGOs, governmental 
agencies) from a wide variety of industries in arenas from the local up to the global level 
(Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006; Hollstein et al., 2017). In this context, network researchers hold a 
plea for managing inter-organizational networks as social systems or structures, which involves 
taking uncertainty into consideration due to its unpredictable changes (Sydow, 2017).  
To date, network research has focused on governance solutions to problems of 
uncertainty, but governance mechanisms adopted by one or more network actors are 
increasingly seen as possible sources of systemic or structural dynamics in inter-organizational 
networks (Gay & Dousset, 2005; Sydow, 2017). In turn, network evolutions may change the 
way in which network actors – such as orchestrators – deal with structural governance dilemmas 
(Paquin & Howard-Grenville, 2013). In response to a recent call for a dynamic theory of 
network governance by coupling conceptual and empirical work (Dagnino, Levanti, & Destri, 
2016), the present research aims to generate a better understanding of how and why governance 
in inter-organizational networks changes over time and the implications of such governance 
evolutions for the network actors by means of a meta-ethnographic study. Specifically, a meta-
ethnographic analysis of 19 longitudinal case studies provides insight into the interplay between 
governance at different levels of aggregation and structural dynamics within inter-




This research contributes to the literature on network dynamics, which has emphasized 
the importance of studying network dynamics for generating a better understanding of the 
performance of networks and its organizational members (Ahuja, Soda, & Zaheer, 2012). A 
better comprehension of network performance follows from the focus on governance dynamics 
in inter-organizational networks. By adopting a meta-ethnographic approach, this research 
allows to empirically investigate the governance dynamics in different types of networks. As 
such, this research does not only respond to the paucity of empirical studies in the area of 
network dynamics, but also demonstrates that governance of inter-organizational networks is 
always possible in other, although not infinite, ways (Ahuja et al. 2012; Sydow, 2017). By 
providing insight into the conditions under which path dependencies occur – which is when 
inter-organizational networks become inflexible and/or develop rigidities over time, this 
research advances the literature on network governance (Sydow, 2017; Zaheer & Soda, 2009). 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Dynamics in inter-organizational networks 
Network researchers have long recognized that inter-organizational networks – whether 
emergent or consciously formed/mandated – are dynamic (Dagnino et al., 2016). Indeed, inter-
organizational networks involve representations of connections between organizations, which 
may change over time (Ahuja et al., 2012; Dagnino et al., 2016; Provan & Kenis, 2008). At any 
point in time, inter-organizational networks are – in line with the social network analysis 
literature – characterized by as a set of nodes (organizations) linked by a set of ties that connect 
these nodes (inter-organizational connections), which result in a network structure or pattern 
(Borgatti & Halgin, 2011). Network dynamics, in turn, involve changes in the number of nodes 
(e.g., addition or subtraction of nodes) or changes in the ties that connect the nodes (e.g., 




strength), which generate an infinite number of patterns of ties that connect nodes (Ahuja et al., 
2012). In other words, networks dynamics are associated with changes in terms of nodes, ties, 
and patterns, which constitute the network structure or architecture.  
Provan & Lemaire (2011) point out that the network dynamics depends on both events 
in the external environment (exogenous drivers) and incentives and pressure from network 
members (endogenous drivers). Sydow (2017) confirms that exogenous environmental 
uncertainty and endogenous system uncertainty need to be considered when managing inter-
organizational networks over time, in that both affect the evolution or dynamics of the network. 
Ahuja et al. (2012) also contend that network dynamics can be driven by not only exogenous 
or random factors beyond the control of the network, but also agency, opportunity, and inertia 
within the network. Here, agency refers to network actors’ motivation or ability to shape the 
network architecture or structure, opportunity refers to the structural context that encourages 
linking within groups rather than across them, and inertia encompasses the pressure for 
persistence and change (Ahuja et al., 2012).  
These exogenous and endogenous factors associated with changes in the network 
structure or architecture also drive network evolutions over time (Popp, MacKean, Casebeer, 
Milward, & Lindstrom, 2014). Gulati, Sytch and Tatarynowicz (2012) identified an inverted U-
shaped evolutionary pattern in small-world wherein the growth of the network is followed by 
its decline. In the early stages, a lot of opportunities exist for forming bridging ties, but these 
opportunities turn into sources of constraint in later stages due to homogenization of the 
networks and separation of some clusters of network actors from the network. In other words, 
the formation of bridging ties declines, while the global separation is growing (Gulati et al., 
2012). Bryson, Crosby & Bryson (2009) also observe a shift from fluid and participatory 
network structures to more exclusive and hierarchical ones throughout the life cycle of 




formation, (2) development and growth, (3) maturity, sustainability, and resilience, and (4) 
death and transformation (Popp et al., 2014). Interestingly, governance appears to play a crucial 
role in the evolution of networks across network phases (Dagnino et al., 2016; Provan & Kenis, 
2008). The next section further elaborates on governance mechanisms in inter-organizational 
networks.  
 
Inter-organizational network governance 
Governance can be defined as an interaction between people or a group of people, where the 
decision-making is not the responsibility of only one of the parties; but where a complex 
interplay of control and balancing mechanisms should enable them to make decisions whereby 
the interests and goals that lie in the foundations of their relationship are realized (Eeckloo 
2008). This definition suggests that governance involves rules and forms that guide collective 
decision-making. Extant research suggests that the same goes for network governance, which 
is defined as “a mechanism of reaching and implementing decisions whereby, instead of 
hierarchy and command or markets and prices, networks and cooperation are at work” 
(Hollstein, Matiaske, & Schnapp, 2017: 1). Building on transaction cost economics and social 
network theory, governance in inter-organizational networks can resolve in multiple ways.  
The transaction cost perspective argues that the transaction costs of exchange are the 
most significant determinants of the governance form (Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995). In 
response to exchange hazards, managers may craft complex contracts that define remedies for 
foreseeable contingencies or specify processes for resolving unforeseeable outcomes. When 
such contracts are too costly to craft and enforce, managers may choose to vertically integrate. 
These explicit organizational structures and legal agreements are labeled as formal, legal or 




Following social network theory, the formation of ties between actors requires specific 
coordination and integration mechanisms (Grandori & Soda, 1995) able to support repeated 
interaction (Nooteboom, 2004) while safeguarding actors from the risks of  inter-organizational 
collaboration (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). In response to possible exchange hazards, managers 
establish  contracts that define remedies for foreseeable contingencies or specify processes for 
resolving unforeseeable outcomes (Williamson, 1981). An alternative governance form 
involves rules based on implicit understandings, which are usually socially derived and 
therefore not accessible through written documents or sanctions through formal positions 
(Poppo & Zenger, 2002). In other words, this form of governance is embedded within social 
relationships. In line with this relational component in social network theory, prior work based 
upon transaction costs economics also shows that relational contracting is the basis for an 
alternative governance form between markets and hierarchies (Mariotti & Cainarca, 1986). 
Relational governance can – in comparison with formal or contractual governance – be 
considered as rather informal and social, in that it is based upon trust and relational norms 
(Griffith & Myers, 2005). Trust refers to the confidence in the partner’s integrity, credibility, 
and benevolence in a risky exchange relationship (Zaheer et al., 1998) whereas relational norms 
refer to shared expectations about the behaviors of each party in inter-organizational networks 




Meta-ethnography is a foundation for a methodology to synthesize existing case studies. 
It is initially described by Noblit and Hare (1988) and enhanced by Doyle (2003) who has tested 
and enhanced  this methodology. Synthesis in a meta-ethnographic study does not mean 




studies.  Indeed, this synthesis is based on the findings and interpretations of existing case 
studies, but a synthesis is achieved through a process of constructing interpretations across case 
studies. In line with case study research, the quality of meta-ethnographic research depends on 
appropriate case selection (Doyle, 2003; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Stake, 2008). Therefore, 
meta-ethnographic researchers first make an inventory of case studies before purposively 
selecting the cases for their research (Doyle, 2003). Purposive case selection, in turn, is not 
additive, which means that meta-ethnographers are not necessarily looking for cases from the 
same research perspective or with the same purpose, findings and/or interpretations. Instead, 
case selection decisions are based on which case studies provide the most fruitful data for the 
research question or the best learning opportunities (Doyle, 2003, Noblit & Hare, 1988). Indeed, 
Doyle (2003) point out that the goal of meta-ethnographic research is to learn from a collection 
of individually unique cases (p. 331). The next section elaborates on the selection of cases with 
the biggest learning opportunities. 
 
Case selection 
To identify the cases with the biggest learning opportunities, we searched the Web of 
Science for longitudinal case studies related to inter-organizational networks. Our search string 
involved synonyms of inter-organizational networks (e.g., inter-organizational relationships, 
cooperative arrangements, and strategic alliances) in combination with the search terms ‘case’ 
or ‘longitudinal’. After the exclusion of articles in other areas than “business economics” and 
non-English articles, 809 records were retained (see figure 1). A case was included when the 
inter-organizational network was an emergent or consciously formed/mandated group of more 
than two organizations connected to each other by a certain pattern or structure that was studied 






Insert Figure 1 about here 
--------------------------------------------- 
To select cases with the best opportunities to learn, theoretical and methodological 
boundary conditions were – in line with the recommendations for meta-ethnographic research 
– taken into consideration: each study had to be more than a description of a case, but involved 
interpretation and analysis based upon established theories and methods (Doyle, 2003). 
Established theories are defined as widely accepted in the literature, which means that the 
theory is extensively and favorably cited in the literature over a period of time (Doyle, 2003). 
As shown in Table 1, the selected case studies are based on social network theory, resource 
based view, dynamic capabilities, social capital theory, service dominant logic, and institutional 
theory. The research methods were deemed established if the authors demonstrated that they 
conducted case study research in rigorous ways. As recommended by Doyle (2003), case 
studies were excluded if they did not include multiple data sources. As shown in Table 1, all 
case studies include minimum two types of data sources. Additionally, we also excluded cases 
without explicit descriptions of methods of analysis. If these analysis methods were described, 
data triangulation, debriefing, and member checks were used as selection criterion for our meta-
ethnographic study.  
--------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
--------------------------------------------- 
The sampling strategy also centers on maximum variation by taking different types of 
case studies into consideration. In line with the recommendations of Noblit and Hare (1988), 
both single case studies and multiple case studies were included in the meta-ethnographic 




perspective (ego network versus whole network).  With regard to the network characteristics, 
networks stem from different industries and have different goals (commercial versus social 
versus both). As such, this sampling strategy has a positive impact on the transferability of the 
research findings (Doyle, 2003).  
--------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
--------------------------------------------- 
Case analysis 
Original case studies involve text with interpretations of the researchers and even the 
language of the researchers in their written interpretations (Dixon-Woods, Shaw, Agarwal, & 
Smith, 2004). These textual units are subjected to an augmented or constructivist grounded 
theory approach with a focus on ‘translations’, which are interpretations of the interpretations 
and talks of researchers through a new lens (Doyle, 2003). Specifically, the textual data 
associated with each case are viewed as fresh data and descriptive narratives (translations) are 
written to tell detailed stories about the network governance dynamics, thereby holding to the 
words of the original authors. Next, the descriptive narratives of different cases were juxtaposed 
to identify key descriptors for each case, which were used to rewrite the descriptive narratives. 
Finally, the key descriptors across cases were juxtaposed to identify the main themes associated 
with network governance dynamics. As such, this data analysis procedure mirrors the idea of 
within-case and cross-case analyses in case study research (Yin, 2013).  
 
RESULTS 
Network governance at different levels of aggregation 
Based upon the meta-ethnographic analyses, a wide variety of governance mechanisms 




characterized as relational or formal. Relational governance mechanisms are based on 
repeated interactions (case 3, 10, 13, 15) and joint actions (case 1, 2, 4, 11, 12, 14), represented 
by trust. Formal governance mechanisms, in turn, encompass making contractual agreements 
for cooperation (case 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9), establishing forum or platform (case 15 and 18), offering 
boards seats to directors of network organizations (case 9), giving more decision power to the 
lead organization (case 11), establishing network administrative organizations (case 13, 14, 17, 
19), establishing new organizations (case 3, 9, 11), and establishing joint venture (case 16). 
Relational and formal governance mechanisms are used at different levels of aggregation: the 
single dyad level associated with interactions between two network organizations, the multiple 
dyad level related to interactions between a focal organization and multiple network 
organizations, and the network level related to interactions between multiple network 
organizations. Illustrative examples of the governance mechanisms at different levels of 
aggregation are given in Table 3. 
--------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
--------------------------------------------- 
Network governance dynamics 
With regard to how governance mechanisms change over time in inter-organizational 
network, Table 4 demonstrates that almost every case is characterized by unique patterns of 
governance mechanisms over time. These governance patterns can be categorized in five 
groups. The purely relational governance pattern involves cases where an increase of 
relational governance at the multiple dyad level is observed (case 1, 3, 12, and 16), which can 
– in the long run – be followed by a decrease of relational governance at the multiple dyad level 
(case 16). The relational – formal governance pattern involves cases characterized by an 




of formal governance at respectively the single/multiple dyad level and the network level (case 
2, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11). After the formal governance increase, all cases within this group – except for 
case 5 – are characterized by an increase of relational governance at the multiple dyad or 
network level. This sequence of relational-formal-relational governance mechanisms is 
repeated over time in case 11. The combined governance pattern consists of cases starting 
with a simultaneous increase of relational and formal governance at the multiple dyad level, 
followed by decreases and subsequently increases of relational and formal governance at the 
multiple dyad level (case 6, 7, and 8). In formal - relational governance pattern, we observe 
a shift from increased formal governance at the network level over increased relational 
governance at the network or multiple dyad level (respectively case 13/14/15 and 19), which 
can be followed by increased formal and relational governance at the multiple dyad level (case 
19). The purely formal governance pattern only consists of increases in formal governance 
at the network level (case 17 and 18).  
--------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
--------------------------------------------- 
Origins of network governance dynamics 
The previous section identified five network dynamic patterns: purely relational, 
relational-formal, combinations of relational and formal, formal-relational, and purely formal 
governance patterns. Interestingly, all case descriptions start when the network is formed, which 
implies that the network formation stage involves relational governance mechanisms, formal 
governance mechanisms, or combinations of both governance mechanisms. 
Further inquiry revealed that relational governance mechanisms are applied when all 
involved network partners expect concrete benefits from collaborating, such as the opportunity 




(case 2), or enter a new market (case 9). In most cases, focal organizations engage in relational 
governance with partner organizations by highlighting the opportunities, thereby forming lead 
organization networks (case 1, 3). A notable exception is case 9, in that this network does not 
involve a lead organization. Instead, a multitude of organizations with specific resources and 
competencies engages in repeated interactions due to shared values and norms. The presence 
of shared values and norms guarantees achievement of a goal that is shared by all network 
organizations (here, fair trade) (see Quote 1).  
Quote 1: “Through the creation of companies and continual enclaving fair trade has 
formed an interconnected network, which this article refers to as the ‘‘ideological network’’, 
of organizations pursuing similar goals in relation to improving living conditions in the 
developing world.” (Davies 2009, case 9, p. 188) 
Organizations who adopt formal governance mechanisms in the network formation 
stage have less insight into the concrete benefits that can be established through a network. 
These organizations do engage in a network with formal governance mechanisms to either meet 
governmental requirements (case 18) or force themselves to identify the concrete cooperation 
benefits by establishing a network administrative organizations (case 13) or forum (case 15). 
Case 14 even involves a combination of both, in that a group of organizations applied for 
governmental funding to form a network administrative organizations (see Quote 2).   
Quote 2: “In late 1990, a state economic development council applied for and obtained 
a large grant to develop "European-style ... networks .. . for small business development." The 
initial grant included multiyear funding for network operations, such as staff and office space, 
and for projects such as trade shows and catalogs.”  (Human & Provan 2006, case 14,  p.335) 
A combination of relational and formal governance mechanisms occurs in networks 




mechanisms by force of habit, but the main decisions are based upon relational governance 
mechanisms. In other words, relational governance mechanisms generate strong ties, while this 
is not the case for formal governance mechanisms (see Quote 3).   
Quote 3: “While defining marketing agreements, and licensing and patent agreements 
as weak ties,” (Capaldo 2007,  p.589 ) 
Path dependence with regard to network governance dynamics 
After its formation, networks are characterized by a status quo or changes in terms of 
governance mechanisms. A status quo in terms of formal governance goes along with 
decreased performance of the network (see Quote 4), while the opposite holds for formal 
governance mechanisms that are complemented with relational governance mechanisms over 
time. Further inquiry revealed that a status quo in terms of formal governance merely occurs 
due to a lack of time and financial resources, or better, a lack of motivation to spend resources 
on participating in a network that is mandated by the government (see Quote 5). The conditions 
under which formal governance mechanisms in inter-organizational networks are 
complemented with relational governance mechanisms over time can be driven by the formal 
governance mechanisms. Specifically, the analysis reveals that formal governance mechanisms 
facilitate the adoption of relational governance mechanisms to the extent that these formal 
governance mechanisms force network organizations to come together (e.g., steering groups 
with directors of network organizations). The network structure, in turn, might also evolve. If 
the network attracts new types of actors or actively builds connections with new types of actors, 
networks prefer to engage in relational governance mechanisms rather than subjecting these 
actors to the already established formal governance mechanisms. The reasons is that new 
network organizations often play a different role in the network. Case 19, for instance, involves 




organization (formal governance mechanism at the network level), the network engages in 
frequent trust-based exchanges with the industry (see Quote 6).  
Quote 4: “a feeling of patient dissatisfaction is reported due to a lack of coordination 
among the operators in the service network” (Tzannis 2013, case 18, p. 1049) 
Quote 5: “GPs signaled a strong feeling and support toward individualism and 
sometimes a lack of vision for the potential future evolution of their profession. ” (Tzannis 2013, 
case 18, p.  1050) 
Quote 6: “ NISP primarily undertook actions we labeled engagement because NISP staff 
sought to involve various audiences, introducing them to the concept of IS and its potential, and 
conveying its value. “ (Paquin & Howard-Grenville 2013, case 18, p. 1633) 
A status quo in terms of relational governance exists when there is a balance between 
the needs of the network organizations and the network as a whole. In those situations, the 
organizations engaged in the network were able to build new knowledge (case 1), develop new 
products (case 12), and generate profits and/or achieve social objectives (case 16). In most 
cases, however, relational governance mechanisms are complemented with formal governance 
mechanisms over time (see Quote 7), although a shift from relational to formal governance 
mechanisms may go along with resistance to change (see Quote 8). This change, however, is 
recommended when the network is growing in terms of number of member organizations, as 
illustrated in case 11. A larger number of network organizations necessitates mechanisms to 
control the contribution of each organization to the network. If network growth is not associated 
with formalization, this may result in negative repercussions for the network members (see 
Quote 4). Furthermore, the network context may also necessitate a shift from relational to 
formal governance mechanisms, as illustrated by case 5 where the emergence of the knowledge 




In most cases, the shift from relational to formal governance mechanisms is associated 
with a reduction of the number of network organizations (see Quote 9), or a network where 
some ties are subject to formal governance mechanisms while other are governed through 
relational governance mechanisms (case 11).  
Quote 7: “The original relation, which (at least formally) was based on consensus 
building among independent organizations, evolved towards a more vertical, command-and-
control style of decision making, where Corona made all relevant decisions and the non-profit 
partner implemented them.” (Gutiérrez et al. 2013, case 11, p. 62) 
Quote 8: “This formalized method has, however, received considerable opposition from 
the founders, who consider the former trust relationships to be adequate.” (Davies 2009, Case 
9, p. 118) 
Quote 9: “From Curtin’s perspective, there is an intentional move towards limiting 
members and establishing greater commitment, i.e. the formation of a net. This intention is not 
necessarily shared by the other participants who may well be comfortable with a looser network 
platform.”(Butler & Soontiens 2015, case 5, p.486) 
 
DISCUSSION 
Drawing on a meta-ethnographic study of longitudinal cases, this research aimed to 
generate a better understanding of how and why governance in inter-organizational networks 
change over time and the implications of such governance evolutions for the network actors. 
As background, this research identifies different relational and formal governance mechanisms, 
which are applied at the single dyad, multiple dyad, and network level. By plotting these 
governance mechanisms at different levels of aggregation over time, five patterns of 




relational-formal, combinations of relational and formal, formal-relational, and purely formal 
governance patterns. The identification of these patterns throughout the network evolution does 
not only respond to the paucity of empirical studies in the area of network dynamics, but also 
contributes to a better understanding of how governance mechanisms in inter-organizational 
networks change over time (Dagnino, et al., 2016). 
Specifically, the present research contributes to a better understanding of network 
governance dynamics by investigating not only its origins, but also factors that explain further 
evolutions of these dynamics in inter-organizational network. Network governance dynamics 
originate from and are further shaped by complex combinations of endogenous factors (i.e., 
network governance mechanisms and network structure) and exogenous or random factors 
beyond the control of the network (i.e., market and governmental factors). This finding builds 
on the network literature, which demonstrates that endogenous and exogenous  factors are 
associated with changes in the network structure or architecture (Ahuja et al., 2002) and also 
drive network evolutions over time (Popp et al., 2014). 
The five governance patterns in inter-organizational networks, however, also 
demonstrate that network governance is always possible in other, although not infinite, ways 
(Ahuja, et al., 2012, Sydow, 2017). Indeed, the present research demonstrates that inter-
organizational networks characterized by relational governance mechanisms in early stages can 
be successful when these mechanisms are complemented by formal governance mechanisms in 
later stages, but the same goes for inter-organizational networks who restrain themselves to 
relational governance mechanisms throughout the network lifecycle. With regard to inter-
organizational networks characterized by formal governance mechanisms in early stages, the 
present research demonstrates that the absence of relational governance mechanisms in later 




governance mechanisms necessitates relational governance mechanisms and therefore 
constrains – or at least – shapes the options for action.   
By providing insight into the conditions under which path dependencies occur – which 
is when inter-organizational networks become inflexible and/or develop rigidities over time, 
this research advances the literature on governance in inter-organizational networks (Sydow, 
2017, Zaheer & Soda, 2009). By investigating governance mechanisms applied in inter-
organizational networks, the present research also contributes to a better understanding of 
formal and relational governance in a network context (Zaheer & Soda, 2009). More 
particularly, relational governance mechanisms involve repeated interactions and joint actions 
represented by trust at the single dyad, multiple dyad, and network level. Formal governance 
mechanisms, in turn, relate to – among others – contractual agreements, the establishment of 
steering groups or network administrative organizations, or the founding of new organizations 
at the single dyad, multiple dyad, and network level.  
Although the meta-ethnographic approach allowed to empirically investigate the 
governance dynamics in a wide range of inter-organizational networks over time, this research 
method has – like any other research methodology – limitations. Meta-ethnographic research 
relies on case study analyses and interpretations of other researchers. As such, this research 
method is subject to the quality of these case study analyses. The quality of the case study 
analyses was taken into consideration by adopting the measures of Doyle (2013), but future 
research validate our research findings by adopting alternative research methods. One path to 
these ends involves a longitudinal survey research where people who participate in inter-
organizational networks in different stages of the network life cycle provide information about 
the network governance mechanisms and the network performance. This research might 
contribute – along with the present contribution – for a better understanding of network 
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Aaboen et al. 2013 
Case 
1 
4 years Ego network Wood and textile Commercial 
Aaboen et al. 2013 
Case 
2 
4 years Ego network Food Commercial 
Aaboen et al. 2013 
Case 
3 
4 years Ego network Gaming Commercial 
Alvarez et al. 2010 
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Governance mechanisms at different layers of aggregation. 
Governance mechanism Illustrative case evidence 
Relational governance at 
single dyad level 
Alpha has learnt a lot from working with C6 regarding how to work 
with international customers. It was also in the interaction with C6 
that the idea for the latest add-on was born (Case 3). 
Relational governance at 
multiple dyad level 
Delta had formed a partnership with (P2) that modifies the wood to 
withstand rot and fire. The partner has one production line dedicated 
to DeltaWood and the contacts have been intensive since they need 
to interact concerning every customer order. A national distributor 
(D) sells the product through 170 retailers to end customers all over 
Sweden. 
Relational governance at 
network level 
At this time there was a big change in the outcomes of interaction 
with the Gloversville tannery, Booth’s first move into ownership of 
manufacturing (Case 10). 
Formal governance at 
single dyad level 
Pre-existing relationships, few actors and a high level of motivation 
from actors involved led to very intense and frequent communication 
among all parties (Case 4). 
Formal governance at 
multiple dyad level 
Alternatively to the contractual methods of man-  
agement, self-enforcement leads to both formal and informal 
mechanisms. The formal mechanisms, such as financial or investment 
hostages (Williamson, 1983), rely on gaining control ofjoint assets to 
align economic incentives tomaintain the relationship.This is visible in 
Day’s relationships in joint ventures with CRG, Sainsbury’s and 
Starbucks, and also in its offering of board seats tomaintain close 
tieswithComicReliefand Christian Aid. (Case 9) 
Formal governance at 
network level 
In the exploitation phase that began in 2010 under new management, 
Corona’s same-sector partnerships were formalized through 







Network governance dynamics across cases 
Author – year Case Network structure Governance mechanisms 
Network  governance 
dynamics 
Aaboen et al. 2013 
Case 1 
Increase in the number of ties 
between the lead organization and 
partner organizations 
Increase in relational governance between the lead 
organization and the partner organizations 
(multiple dyad) relational 
Aaboen et al. 2013 
Case 2 
Increase in the number of ties 
between the lead organization and 
partner organizations. Two of the 
partner organizations connected with 
the lead organization (key partners) 
have a lot of ties with other 
organization thereby generating new 
ties with the lead organization over 
time.  
(1) Increase in relational governance between the 
lead and the partner organizations  (multiple dyad), 
(2) An additional increase in relational governance 
between the lead organization and its key partners 
(multiple dyad) and an increase in formal 
governance between one of the two key partners 
and the lead organizations (single dyad), (3) 
Increase in relational governance between the lead 
and the new partner organizations (multiple dyad) relational - formal 
Aaboen et al. 2013 
Case 3 
(1) Foundation of an acquisition 
between the lead organization and the 
first customer (2) Thereby generating 
ties with new partner organizations 
(1) Increase in relational governance between the 
lead organization and the partner organizations 
(multiple dyad) relational 
Alvarez et al. 2010 
Case 4 
(1) Increase in the number of ties 
between the lead organization and 
partner organizations 
(1) Increase in relational governance between the 
lead and the partner organizations  (multiple dyad), 
(2) Increase in formal governance from the 
establishment of a basic programme to the 
enrolment of more specified programme wich 




includes contracts and quality assesment (network 
level), (3) Increase in the strength of the 




(1) Increase in the number of ties 
between the lead organization and 
partner organizations (2) Decrease in 
the number of ties  
(1)  Increase in relational governance between the 
lead and the partner organizations  (multiple 
dyad)(loose network structure) (2) Intensifying 
relational  governance between the lead and the 
remaining partner organizations and an increase in 
formal governance between the remaining partner 
organizations and the lead organizations relational - formal 
Capaldo 2007 
Case 6 
(1) Increase in the number of ties 
between the lead organization and 
partner organizations (2) Decrease in 
the number of ties (3) Increase in the 
number of ties between the lead 
organization and partner 
organizations (4) Decrease in the 
number of ties (5) Increase in the 
number of ties between the lead 
organization and partner 
organizations 
1)  Increase in relational and contractual 
governance between the lead and the partner 
organizations  (multiple dyad) (2) Increase in 
relational governance between a select number of 
ties (multiple dyad) while decreasing the relational 
and formal governance of the other ties (3)  
Increase in relational and contractual governance 
between the lead and the partner organizations  
(multiple dyad) (4) Increase in relational 
governance between a select number of ties 
(multiple dyad) while decreasing the relational and 
formal governance of the other ties (5)  Increase in 
relational and contractual governance between the 






(1) Increase in the number of ties 
between the lead organization and 
partner organizations (2) Decrease in 
the number of ties (3) Increase in the 
number of ties between the lead 
organization and partner 
organizations  
1)  Increase in relational and contractual 
governance between the lead and the partner 
organizations  (multiple dyad) (2) Increase in 
relational governance between a select number of 
ties (multiple dyad) while decreasing the relational 
and formal governance of the other ties (3)  
Increase in relational and contractual governance 
between the lead and the partner organizations  
(multiple dyad) formal and relational 
Capaldo 2007 
Case 8 
(1) Increase in the number of ties 
between the lead organization and 
partner organizations (2) Decrease in 
the number of ties (3) Increase in the 
number of ties between the lead 
organization and partner 
organizations (4) Decrease in the 
number of ties (5) Increase in the 
number of ties between the lead 
organization and partner 
organizations 
1)  Increase in relational and contractual 
governance between the lead and the partner 
organizations  (multiple dyad) (2) Increase in 
relational governance between a select number of 
ties (multiple dyad) while decreasing the relational 
and formal governance of the other ties (3)  
Increase in relational and contractual governance 
between the lead and the partner organizations  
(multiple dyad) (4) Increase in relational 
governance between a select number of ties 
(multiple dyad) while decreasing the relational and 
formal governance of the other ties (5)  Increase in 
relational and contractual governance between the 






(1) Foundation of  new organization 
(network ownership) building on the 
ties between several  partners in the 
network, (2) Increase in the number of 
ties between these organizations and 
the partner organizations 
(1)  Increase in relational governance between the 
organization whereby the newly founded 
organisations are central (multiple dyad), (2) An 
increase in contractual and formal agreements 
between one of the central organizations with 
another partner relational - formal 
Ford and Redwood 
2005 
Case 10 
(1) Increase in the number of ties 
between the lead organization and 
partner organizations. (2) Tie with one 
of the partners generates ties with 
new partner organizations (3) 
Decrease in the number of ties  
(1) Increase in relational governance between the 
lead and the partner organizations  (multiple dyad), 
(2) An additional increase in contractual governance 
between the lead organization and one of its key 
partners (single dyad, change in ownership), (3) 
Increase in relational governance between the lead 
and the new partner organizations (multiple dyad) relational - formal 
Gutiérrez et al. 2016 
Case 11 
(1) Establishment of a tie between the 
lead organization and another partner 
(2) Increase in the number of ties 
between the lead organization and 
new partner organizations (3) 
Decrease in the number of ties 
between the lead organization and 
these partner organizations (4) 
Increase in the number of ties 
between the lead organization and 
new partner organizations (5) End of 
these ties between the lead 
organization and the partner 
(1) Increase in relational governance between the 
lead organization and the partner organizations 
(multiple dyad) (2) Intensifying relational  
governance between the lead and the remaining 
partner organizations and an increase in formal 
governance between the remaining partner 
organizations and the lead organizations (3) 
Increase in relational governance between the lead 
and new partner organizations (multiple dyad), (4) 
Stop of relational governance, (5) Change in 
contractual governance of the project (network 
level) (change in the ownership), increase in 
relational governance and formal between the lead 
organization and one new partner 




organizations, (6) Replacement of ties 
with NPOs by one tie HRM-firm  
organization(single dyad) and a decrease of the 
other relationships (6) Contractual governance of 
same-sector-partnerships 
Gutiérrez et al. 2016 Case 12 
(1) Increase in the number of ties 
between the lead organization and 
partner organizations. (2) One of the 
partner organizations connected with 
the lead organization (key partner) 
have  ties with other organizations 
thereby generating new ties with the 
lead organization over time.  
(1) increase in relational governance between the 
lead organization and the partner organizations 
(multiple dyad)  relational 
Human and Provan 
2000 Case 13 
(1) Increase in the number of ties 
between the partner organizations (2) 
Decrease in the number of ties 
between the partner organizations.(3) 
Increase in the number of ties 
between the partner organizations 
(1) establishment of a NAO which is an increase in 
contractual governance (network level), (2) Further 
increase in relational governance between the  
partner organizations (network level), (3) Decrease 
in relational governance, (4) Increase in relational 
governance  formal - relational 
Human and Provan 
2000 
Case 14 
(1) Increase in the number of ties 
between the partner organizations (2) 
decrease in the number of ties 
between the partner organizations.(3) 
(1) establishment of a NAO which is an increase in 
contractual governance (network level), (2) further 
increase in relational governance between the  
partner organizations (network level), (3) decrease 




Further decrease in the number of ties 
between the partner organizations 
in relational governance, (4) further decrease in 
relational governance  
Jack et al. 2010 
Case 15 
(1) Increase in the number of ties 
between a lead organization and the 
partner organizations (2) Increase in 
the number of ties between the 
partner organizations (3) Decrease in 
the number of ties between the 
partner organizations (4) Decrease in 
the number of ties between the 
partner organizations (5) Increase in 
the number of ties between the 
partner organizations 
(1) lead organization establishes formal governance 
at network level (i.e. forum),  (2)  Increase in 
relational governance between the  partner 
organizations (network level), (3) Decrease  in 
relational governance between the  partner 
organizations (network level), (4)  Increase in 
relational governance between the  partner 
organizations (network level),  formal - relational 
Lin et al. 2010 
Case 16 
(1) Increase in the number of ties 
between a lead organization and the 
partner organizations (2) Further 
increase in the number of ties 
between a lead organization and a 
different  type of partner 
organizations (3) Decrease in the 
number of ties, (4) Further decrease in 
the number of ties, (5) Increase in the 
number of ties 
(1) Increase in relational governance between the 
lead organization and the partner organizations 
(multiple dyad), (2) Increase in relational 
governance between the lead organization and the 
partner organizations (multiple dyad), (3) Increase 
in relational governance between a select number 
of ties (multiple dyad) while decreasing the 
relational governance of the other ties, (4) Decrease 
in relational governance between the lead 
organization and the partner organizations 
(multiple dyad), (5) Increase in relational 
governance between the lead organization and the 




Tello-Rozas et al., 
2015 
Case 17 
(1) Increase in the number of ties 
between the partner organizations 
(1) Increase in the contractual governance on 




(1) Increase in the number of ties 
between the partner organizations 
(1) Increase in the formal governance on network 




(1) Increase in the number of ties 
between the partner organizations, (2) 
decrease in the number of parnters in 
the network  
(1) Contractual network governance, (2) Increase in 
relational governance between the NAO and the 
partner organizations (multiple dyadic), (3) Increase 
in relational and formal governance between the 
members of the organization (multiple dyadic)  formal - relational 
 
